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“Rev.” Donald Trump and the Christian Right –
A Secular Transformation of the Great Awakening Heritage
John Francis Burke,
Trinity University
Abstract
Over the past five years, the curious relationship between Donald Trump and many
conservative evangelicals has been at the intersection of US religion and politics.
Explanations for this curious linkage include:
•
John Fea’s accent on the historical fear of evangelicals of the other.
•
Ben Howe’s claim that evangelicals have chosen power over values.
•
Whitehead and Perry’s articulation of a U.S. Christian nationalism.
•
Kristin Kobes Du Mez’s feminist critique of U.S. Christian masculinity.
•
Timothy Carney’s connection between social collapse and Trumpism.
This paper argues that each of these arguments capture important parts of the
Trump-evangelical nexus, but not the complete picture. Fea’s historical approach
needs to be complemented by Whitehead and Perry’s quantitative approach and
vice-versa. By synthesizing these arguments and well as others, this paper shows
how Donald Trump and his evangelical partners have fostered a civil religion that
secularizes the Great Awakening heritage. This is particularly evident in Trump’s
rhetorical style, public policies, and the character of his campaign rallies.
Paper
Since the 1970s, faith-based organizations, especially of the evangelical persuasion,
have become politically mobilized in reaction to what they have seen as the moral
relativism that emerged from the major shifts in cultural norms in the 1960s. First as
the Moral Majority and later as the Christian Coalition, these political advocates have
had a major impact on U.S. politics, not just at the national level, but especially at
the state and local level.
Nevertheless, the embrace of Donald Trump by the Christian Right is quite
striking. President Trump is not the first person who comes to mind in terms of
being a paragon of moral virtue. He has never been known to be a regular church
goer and his alleged sexual encounters with women would hardly qualify him as a
Christian exemplar. Furthermore, in Christian terms, he has never been one to ask
for forgiveness for his sins nor is he the humblest person in terms of personality.
Yet, he has managed to gain a lot of support from evangelical leaders and voters.
Indeed, in 2016, Trump received 81% of the evangelical vote in the general election.
This support actually exceeded that George W. Bush, John McCain, and Mitt
Romney received in previous presidential elections (Fea 2018, 5-6). In turn, in the
2020 fall election, Trump gained the support 75-80% of white evangelical Christian
voters as well as 57% of white Catholics (Schor 2020b).
A growing number of journalistic and academic studies have explored this
curious marriage between Donald Trump and the Christian Right. Ben Howe (2019)
argues that in supporting Trump, evangelicals have chosen power over values.
Katherine Stewart contends this pursuit of power is actually a political ideology that
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can be traced to Rousas John Rushdoony’s works on pursuing Christian
Reconstructionism, “a theocratic movement seeking to infuse our society at all levels
with a biblical worldview” (2019, 103). Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry (2020)
suggest that this nexus is rooted in a white Christian nationalism that is distinct from
religious commitment. Kristin Kobes Du Mez (2020) argues in turn that this
nationalism is steeped in patriarchal thinking and projection of the traditional work v.
home roles for men and women. Sarah Posner (2020) connects white Christian
nationalism to the growing impact of the alt-right. Robert Jones (2020) contends
there is a long legacy of white supremacy in US Christianity, although the connection
to Trump’s racist rhetoric is implicit rather than explicit in this study. John Fea (2018)
maintains that the Christian Right’s embrace of Trump is connected to the
longstanding history of evangelical fear of “the other.” Finally, Timothy Carney (2019)
connects Trump’s success at galvanizing conservative voters to communities whose
economic opportunities and social intermediate institutions have collapsed and
whose residents consequently feel “left behind.”
The “marriage” between Trump and the Christian Right also reflects James
Davison Hunter’s culture wars thesis: that the liberal-conservative divide politically
reflects a liberal-conservative divide in theology and philosophy. The liberal side is
more open-ended and pluralistic in its conceptualization of the relationship of God to
the world and tends to stress in political terms the pursuit of social justice. The
conservative side, conversely, sees God in rigid, steadfast certain terms; it stresses
the importance of cultivating personal virtue and politically what it sees as
fundamentally evil threats, such as communism or relativists moralities (Hunter 1991).
These competing spiritual imaginations increasingly have divided church
communities (Radcliffe 2005). Trump’s appeal to the Christian Right is clearly on the
conservative side of this divide.
Although these studies are all extremely valuable, they either reduce the
support given by the Christian Right to Trump to the different facets of the US culture
wars since World War II or in Fea’s case, primarily focus on the historical
antecedents within US evangelicalism. To understand the nexus between Trump
and the evangelicals, one has to first integrate the historical and contemporary
analyses. More than just an ideological or cultural political movement, the politics of
the Christian Right is the latest chapter in a long history of how the evangelical
revival tradition has articulated ideas that has led to the marginalization and
persecution of “others.” Second, one needs to grasp that not only has Trump tapped
into this heritage, but that his political engagement of his supporters has secularized
both the affect and effect of the Great Awakenings in U.S. history so as to foster a
divisive civil religion.
My methodology, pure and simple, is the interpretation of texts. My
contribution is to integrate the contemporary focus of some of these scholars with
the historical analysis of other scholars. I also draw from my own experience as a
lay Christian liturgist to suggest how the format, ambiance, and effects of the Great
Awakening revivals have been recast by Trump into political theatre. In turn, I am
using the term “Christian Right” as an umbrella term for conservative traditions within
U.S. Christianity. Although I will primarily be focusing on evangelicals, at times I will
also make reference to the Puritans, fundamentalists, and even conservative
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Catholics as being part of this larger Christian Right umbrella, both in history and
present-day.
I will present my argument in four sections. The first section will review the
extensive entanglements between Trump and the Christian Right. The second
section will review the studies that contend this nexus has to understood primarily in
political ideological, not theological, terms. The third section will challenge this
rendering by showing the theological concepts and historical antecedents that inform
the Christian Right’s engagement of politics. The final section will explore how
indeed the growing secularism of U.S. society has provided a backdrop by which
Trump, especially in his campaign rallies, has secularized the Great Awakening
heritage.
The Christian Right’s Embrace of Donald Trump
Several evangelical leaders have sung Donald Trump’s praises. Robert
Jeffress, of First Baptist Church in Dallas, Texas, supported Trump on the basis,
drawing from Augustine and Martin Luther, that we needed a strong government to
restrain evil (Fea 2018, 124-29). The Independent Network Charismatics supported
Trump on the basis that a leader was needed who would lead the U.S. back to
prosperity and extend “the dominion of Jesus Christ over all the earth” (Fea 2018, 133).
Paula White, one of the leading preachers of the prosperity gospel – “faith, wealth,
health, and victory” – has been an integral member of Trump’s entourage and
actually claimed the president has had “a born-again experience” (Fea 2018, 136).
In political terms, this curious marriage between Trump and the evangelical
community lies in a legacy of liberal laws and federal court decisions over the past
six decades that, from the Christian Right standpoint, have eroded the Christian
ideals that supposedly have informed U.S. political life since its founding. Court
cases like Engel v. Vitale (1962) removing state led prayer in public schools and Roe
v. Wade (1973) providing for state sanctioning of abortion, at least in the first
trimester of pregnancy, in the eyes of evangelicals, have encouraged a growing
moral laxity and relativism in U.S. society (Fea 2018, 56).
In the 1990s, the inability of conservative Congressional members to remove
President Bill Clinton from public office on the basis of his sexual misdeeds with a
White House intern signified to evangelicals to what extent U.S. politics and society
seemed to be heading, so-to-speak, “to hell in a handbasket.” By 2016, Hillary
Clinton, both in terms of being emblematic of the post 1960s non-traditional woman,
and whose advocacy of big government socio-economic policies that supposedly
would further erode a Christian America, was in evangelical terms, “the enemy to be
defeated” (Fea 2016, 71).
Previous Republican presidents such as Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and
George W. Bush claimed to have the Christian Right political concerns at heart, but
did very little in actual policies to realize them. In the past, evangelical leaders such
as Billy Graham, Cal Thomas, and James Dobson had been brought into White
House circles only to realize that they were just being used by Republican
presidents to get the evangelical vote. David Kwo, in fact, shares that evangelical
leaders, when out of sight, were even disparaged as “’goofy’” by key advisors in the
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Bush White House (Fea 2018, 145-52). In turn, liberal secular society often has had a
disparaging view of the evangelical world.
As much as two decades earlier, many in the Christian Right made a scathing
critique of Bill Clinton’s character, especially given the Monica Lewinsky sexual tryst;
as a result, evangelical leaders became fed up with Washington politics and
social/political correctness. Consequently, they were willing to abandon their
scruples regarding character to turn, in the words of Robert Jeffress, to “the meanest
son-of-a-you-know-what I can find” to push their political agenda (Du Mez 2020, 14;
Wehner 2019, 84).
And indeed, Trump delivered on many Christian Right issues. He made
extensive appointments of conservative justices to the federal judiciary, including
three U.S. Supreme Court justices (Fea 2018 138). He encouraged conservative state
legislatures to pass anti-abortion legislation that does not just make it more difficult
to get an abortion, but seeks to challenge Roe by regulating abortion earlier and
earlier in pregnancies. In addition, he moved the U.S. embassy in Israel to
Jerusalem.
In turn, on church-state entanglements, Trump supported freedom of religious
expression, as evidenced in his opposition to the Johnson amendment which curtails
formal institutional church involvement in politics (Fea 2018, 142-43). On the other
hand, he blithely ignored actions raising possible violations of the establishment
clause. More to the point, the Trump administration was very generous in providing
federal bailout loans to churches so as to protect church jobs. Paula White’s church,
City of Destiny received between $150,000 and $350,000 and Robert Jeffress’s
church, First Baptist Dallas received between $2 million and $5 million in paycheck
payments. Overall, the Associated Press reported that the Trump administration
gave somewhere between $17.3 and $42.3 million in terms of bailout loans (Schor
2020a). Clearly, President Trump provided tangible support to the Christian Right
and conversely this community has become entangled in the political pursuit of
power politics. As Howe (2019) insists, evangelical leaders have opted for power in
ways inconsistent with Christian morality and ethics.
Explaining Christian Nationalism – Patriarchalism, Policy Issues, Political
Idolatry
What explains this push for political power by the Christian Right, beyond just
the lust for power in and of itself? The tendency in the prevailing explanations is to
claim a political or social explanation rather than one taken from theology or
spirituality. Kristin Kobes De Mez argues that “evangelicalism must be seen as a
cultural and political movement rather than as a community defined chiefly by its
theology [or the Bible]” (2020, 298). Susan Posner claims the Christian Right’s “real
driving force, though, was not religion but grievances over school desegregation,
women’s rights, LGBTQ rights, affirmative action and more” (2020, xvi-xviii). Katherine
Stewart contends Christian nationalism is “not a religious creed,” but a political
ideology and movement principally seeking power (2019, 3). Andrew Whitehead and
Perry claim that the Christian Right projects a Christian nationalism is that is neither
at root Christian nor religious (2020, 20).
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Each of these claims merit further examination. Du Mez shows how over the
past century, the Christian Right has focused on cultivating masculinity. Her review
of key figures is a “who’s who” of key evangelical, political, and entertainment figures
who over the past century promote or are used to promote this end: John Wayne,
Billy Graham, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Oliver North, the Promise Keepers,
and Marc Driscoll among others. Her interpretive lens dwells upon how this focus on
Christian masculinity to sustain the strong American West hero, of which John
Wayne is the exemplar, projects “patriarchy and submission, sex and power” in
public and family life (Du Mez 2020, 94).
Whereas Du Mez dwells on the mythos of the American West, Sarah Posner
looks to Eastern Europe for her portrayal of the Christian Right. Posner does an
excellent job of illustrating how the Christian Right and the alt-right come to weave in
and out of each other. Her most noteworthy claim is that in terms of foreign affairs,
that the Trump administration, with the support of the Christian Right, has embraced
strongmen like Putin in Russia and Orban in Hungary. The justification is that these
strongmen are reinforcing traditional Christianity as a bulwark against the relativism
of secular humanism which dominates Western Europe and the United States
(Posner 188-218). This turn to the East also suggests that Donald Trump’s blind eye
toward Eastern Europe is not just due to a personal scandal or financial
entanglements with Russia. It also suggests why the Christian Right’s support of
Israel is not just to save the Holy Land, but that semi-authoritarian leaders like
Netanyahu, as well as conservative religious parties, are allies to rescue Western
civilization from secular mores.
Stewart provides an exhaustive account of how Christian Right leaders have
become interlocked with political and economic elites seeking, through political
mobilization, cultural socialization, and domination of the country’s judiciaries, to
replace pluralistic democracy with a conservative hierarchical social order. The
normative basis of this movement she traces back to Southern religious thinking
justifying the institution of slavery. This focus on sustaining “the South’s
segregationist ’way of life’” (Stewart 124) in turn has been recast, she argues, in the
contemporary era by Rushdoony’s articulation of a Christian Reconstructionism
“rooted in hierarchy” (112).
Whitehead and Perry go the furthest in showing how a Christian nationalism
informs the support of the Christian Right for Trump. This perspective, they suggest,
seeks to establish their vision of a Christian nation in the political and social spheres.
This outlook, they contend, more than “just repackaged ethnocentrism, racial
resentment, or authoritarianism” (Whitehead 2020, 20), is “a collection of myths,
traditions, symbols, narratives, and values systems” that integrate “Christianity with
American civic life” (10). This integration entails white male supremacy in the political
order and a traditional family structure. Their quantitative study suggests Christian
nationalism as opposed to religious commitment of practices is connected to support
of white supremacy politics. Essentially, Christian nationalism is a religious variation
on what the nationalist literature would term an ethnocultural nationalism (Heywood
2017, 174-76).

Based upon these studies and others, I submit there are at least ten key
components to this Christian nationalism. First, the Christian Right stresses that
leaders need to be strong warriors. Precisely because previous presidents,
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especially Republican ones, insufficiently delivered on the Christian Right’s political
agenda, evangelical leaders like Donald Jeffress threw their support to the irreverent
strongman, Trump. Indeed, leaders of the Christian Right have characterized
President Trump either as Cyrus, the secular leader who allowed the exiled Jews to
return to Jerusalem, or as the new Nehemiah, who actually rebuilt Jerusalem after
the Jewish exile in Persia (Fea 2018, 123 & 131-32). Although Trump may be of dubious
character, he is supposedly was a “vessel” through which the Lord was working his
will (Howe 2019, 41).
Second, Christian nationalism promotes reinforcing traditional gender roles.
Men are supposedly the protectors and women are supposed to be pure and
submissive to men – again, the virile masculinity stressed by Du Mez. Men are the
breadwinners and women are the stewards of hearth and home. This binary is quite
vividly advocated not just by men but by Phyllis Schlafly and “traditional” women,
especially members of Eagle Forum, a conservative political interest group which
she founded and chaired, who mobilized to torpedo ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment in the 1970s. As Du Mez stresses, and ironically so, given Du Mez’
feminine interpretive scheme, Schlafly unites “white Christians around a rigid and
deeply conservative vision of family and nation” (Du Mez 2020, 73). Specifically, she
forged an effective coalition between Catholic, evangelical, and Mormon women,
most of whom were in “the white middle and working classes” (Du Mez 73). In seeking
the perpetuation of traditional gender roles in the public and family spheres, they
raised “a larger moral and existential threat to women, and the nation.” Not only did
Schlafly’s advocacy consolidate the worldview of the Christian Right, she and her
ERA feminist adversaries had a lot to do with the Democrat and Republican parties
realigning into genuinely liberal and conservative parties.
Third, Christian nationalism embraces the populist patriotism of the white
working class thar rises in response to the political protests of the 1960s and early
1970s, especially over Vietnam (Du Mez 2020, 51-62). This patriotism becomes even
more volatile as the United States shifts from being industrial to being high tech.
The decline of well-paid manufacturing jobs leads to a decline in the middle-class
standard of living that white workers had access to in mid-century America.
A candidate who comes along and says he is going to restore those jobs and make
their lives great again is very seductive. As this so-called silent majority becomes a
minority in the 21st century, except in small towns and rural areas (Whitehead 2020, 37),
it is ripe for militant grievances and actions.
Fourth, Christian nationalism, thus, puts for the notion of a mythical U.S. past
that we need to reconstruct. It is questionable that this idyllic past ever existed, but
to the degree that it did, it represented a world in which White Anglo Saxon
Protestant culture predominated. Rushdoony’s propagation of the debatable notion
that the U.S. was founded as a Christian nation leads to the contemporary fight “to
redeem America from its commitment to godless humanism” (Stewart 2019, 113). In
addition, even the United States Conference of Bishops joins this chorus when it has
called for “[restoring] America’s lost godliness” (Whitehead 2020, 77).
Fifth, Christian nationalism argues that there are evils that have to be
combatted to sustain the Christian way of life. During the 1950s and 60s, on the
foreign front, communism was seen as antithetical to the Christian way of life. In the
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twenty-first century, radical Islam is seen as the evil to be vanquished. Obviously,
Trump was able to take advantage of this sentiment with his so-called Muslim ban.
On the domestic front, in the 1950s through the 1970s, desegregation of schools
was to be resisted insofar as it supposedly threatened the American way of life. This
justified the creation of private Christian schools that remain overwhelmingly
attended by whites. Today, LGBTQ rights is an anathema to threat to the Christian
Right. Divorce is also problematic, even though some of the evangelical leaders
have been divorced (Whitehead 2020, 143).
Sixth, Christian nationalists argue for the exclusion of others that threaten
white supremacy. After all, in this nationalist view, real Americans are native-born
whites (Whitehead 2020, 91). Consequently, in this “us v. them” binary, among the
excluded are nonwhites, homosexuals, Muslims, Jews, seculars, and other nonChristians. Curiously enough, Christian nationalists see themselves as the ones
who are the victims in a highly liberal secular society, not groups that have suffered
subjugation and discrimination such as African Americans. In turn, opposition to
affirmative action by Christian nationalists feeds off this sentiment (Whitehead 2020;
Gorski 2021).
Seventh, Christian nationalism is devoted to supporting religious, social, and
political institutions that “defend cultural preferences, preserve their political
influence and maintain the ‘proper’ social order. In policy terms, Christian nationalist
are strong supporters of the military, the death penalty, and gun rights (Whitehead
2020, 77-83; Gorski 2021). In symbolic terms, they wrap themselves in the American
flag. Barack Obama’s 2008 remark regarding people who “cling to guns or religion
or [show] antipathy to people who aren't like them,” (Obama Angers, 2008), only
reinforced the sentiment that a traditional moral and civil order had to be defended
by the assault from liberal, secular culture. Hence, why again why one needs a
strong warrior to stand up for traditional beliefs.
Eighth, building on this warrior motif, as aforementioned, the Christian
Right, in terms of foreign affairs, is very attracted to foreign authoritarian-like leaders
like Putin or Orban who rigorously sustain a traditional political culture. Giving
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilization” a new twist (Huntington 1996), the fight
within Western civilization, according to Christian nationalism, is between
traditionalist Christian culture and secular relativist moralities.
Ninth, given the global migrations begat by international unrest and the global
economy, Christian nationalists stand staunchly opposed to non-white immigration.
Donald Trump, especially through his border wall rhetoric and immigration policies,
was very effective at playing to the racist fears of those who see white privilege
being eroded by non-white hoards “invading” the country. At best, non-whites have
a place as long as they assimilate to Christian nationalist values and viewpoints
(Huntington 2004).
Tenth, and in sum, Christian nationalism stands in opposition to a pluralist,
secular liberal democracy full of multiple religions, moralities, and viewpoints.
Instead, the Christian right stands steadfast behind a clearly nativist defined set of
values that “create, support, and maintain symbolic and social boundaries that
exclude non-Christians from full inclusion into American civil life” (Whitehead 2020, 161).
In sum, Christian nationalism is projected through white American cultural values.
81

The 2021 Proceedings of the ASSR

The Historical Spiritual Lifeworld of the Christian Right
The suggestions made by the preceding scholars that the support of
evangelicals for Donald Trump is not to be understood from the standpoint of
theology or spirituality, but rather in the context of patriarchalism, public policy
conflicts, and cultural ideology has a great deal of merit. However, their arguments
downplay, and in some cases overlook, that almost from its inception in U.S. history,
evangelical religion had both a populist fervor and a commitment to fostering and
sustaining a clear vision of community life, steeped in genuinely religious narratives.
I contend the Christian Right’s political mobilization is the descendent of what
Philip Gorski argues is religious nationalism, going all the way back to the Puritans.
Religious nationalists, according the Gorksi, “fuse religion and politics, to make
citizenship in the one the mark of citizenship in the other, to purge all those who lack
the mark, and to expand the borders of the kingdom as much as possible, by violent
means if necessary” (2017, 17). Indeed, Whitehead and Perry acknowledge their
study’s articulation of Christian nationalism is indebted to Gorski’s framework.
(Whitehead 2020, 13-14).
Gorski contends religious nationalists draw their vision from the Jewish
religious texts and the Christian Bible; these documents are not just window
dressing for an underlying conservative ideology or patriarchalism. He adds two
other components. First, religious nationalists push a conquest narrative. This
narrative emphasizes blood sacrifices that go back to the animal sacrifices in
Leviticus. But this leads to, according to Gorski, that “religion, people, land, and
polity are cemented together with dried blood in form of blood sacrificed to God”
(2017, 21).
The other narrative, especially taken from Revelation is an apocalyptic
struggle between good and evil: Christ returns to smite Satan and establishes a
harmonious thousand-year reign (Gorski 2017, 22). Well, this narrative plays very well
into the contemporary evangelical insistence of standing up to and vanquishing the
perpetrators of evil. One does not have to go looking for purely political sources that
inform the “good us v. evil them” mentality. The Christian Right is drawing from
longstanding narratives in the U.S. Christian tradition.
The legacy of the Puritans in this regard is both positive and negative. On the
positive side, the Puritans emphasized that morally we have to be concerned about
a common good. However, as Gorski points out, on the negative side, the Puritans
articulated conquest and apocalyptic narratives. First, the Puritans saw the New
World as a promised land, but saw the Indians as Canaanites who were to be
removed (Gorski 2021). As much as evangelicals might claim the Puritans were a
vanguard for religious liberty, they constructed exclusionary communities who
persecuted nonconformists and witches (Fea 2018, 76-84). Second, as articulated by
Cotton Mather, was the conviction that the New World “would be the central
battlefield in the final struggle between good and evil” (Gorski 2021). Third, in their
quest to “redeem the nations of the world,” the Puritans set in motion the notion of
American exceptionalism that will become in the 19th century, Manifest Destiny
(Hogue 2018, 84-85). A fear of the “other,” thus, is very much inscribed in these “pure”
undertakings that will ultimately inform the politics of the Christian Right. This “us v.
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them” moral binary was very much at work in the Capital insurrection on 6 January
2021.
In turn, the Great Awakenings of the 18th and 19th centuries are pivotal in
branding evangelicalism in both style and substance. On an institutional level, the
initial Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s challenged the more formal
hierarchical ecclesiastical structures of the Anglican among other traditions. Hence
there is a very democratic spirit in the Great Awakening that both challenged
“established religions” and put forth religious freedom, that in turn would lead to the
fight for political independence in the American Revolution (Corbett 1999, 46). These
revivals also placed great stress upon holiness as a voluntary realization and thus,
conversion was a choice made by an individual. This movement emphasized the
spirituality of the common person against that of the elite – a sense of individual
agency essential for a democratic polity (Weaver 2009, 113-14; Corbett 1999, 46). This
above-mentioned conversion also was a highly emotional experience through which
a person achieved a new birth and ultimately chose Christ as their personal savior.
In turn, the frontier dynamic of the Great Awakenings, especially in the
second one in the 1820s and 1830s, manifested a populist critique of ecclesiastical
elites. In many respects, this critique anticipates the contemporary red state – blue
state divide. Finally, the millennial aspect of the Great Awakenings meant that one
was called to realize the kingdom of God. One was called to not just seek
conversions, but bring about “a better social order” (Corbett 1997, 46). As Randall
Balmer points out, evangelicals took from the Puritans an emphasis on piety, from
Scots-Irish Presbyterianism an emphasis on doctrine, and from European pietists
the demonstration of a warm-hearted faith. Living by the authoritative Bible, being
born again, and evangelizing the Christian message became staples of evangelical
Christianity (Balmer 2020, 79).
Over the next two and half centuries, this fusion of piety, doctrinal purity, and
social engagement led to both progressive and conservative social movements. On
the positive side, the evangelical concern for community life established crusades for
“public education, prison reform, advocacy for the poor, and the rights of women”
(Balmer 2020, 80). Charles Finney, a key figure in the Second Great Awakening, saw
social responsibility as a “necessary corollary of faith” (Balmer 2020, 80). He was very
leery of the impact of capitalism.
In turn, the evangelical heritage was deeply involved in the abolitionist
movement and then at the turn of the twentieth century, was ingrained in the push
for Prohibition. The latter involvement was not only because of the evil of drink but
because of the abuse that women and children endured at the hands of their
inebriated husbands/fathers. Without a doubt, the evangelical zeal for social reform
influenced the social ministry of Jane Addams at Hull House. In turn, the Social
Gospel Movement of Addams’s period was influenced by evangelical thinking in
addition to liberal Protestantism. Evangelicals, especially in the nineteenth century
“took special notice of those on the margins of society – women, slaves, the victims
of war and abuse, prisoners, the poor – those Jesus called ‘the least of these’”
(Balmer 2020, 83).
On the other hand, there are very negative examples of this evangelical
fusion of piety, doctrine, and zealous social reform. The fear of a misbegotten
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America, has had a long history in the history of U.S. evangelism. The First Great
Awakening targeted both Catholics and Jews as embodiments of evil. Specifically,
Jonathan Edwards, one of the leading preachers of the revival, projected the
collapse of Islam and Christianity (Kidd 2010, 47). In turn, moving forward to the U.S.
founding, evangelicals characterized the deist ideas of Thomas Jefferson and
Thomas Paine as perpetrating “godlessness” and “’infidelity’” that was deluging our
land” (Fea 2018, 96-97).
In the 19th century, the Second Great Awakening, renewed evangelical fervor
through camp meetings as the settlers spread westward across the United States.
At the same time, evangelical rhetoric vilified the growing number of Irish and
German Catholic immigrants. As John Fea points out, Lyman Beecher’s “Plea for
the West” captures both dimensions of this Awakening. On the one hand, Beecher
opposed slavery and also called for the expansion of women’s roles in public life.
On the other hand, when articulating the intelligence, moral principles, and patriotism
necessary to sustain the U.S. political compact, he referred to “immigrants ‘wielded
by sinister design’” – a thinly veiled riposte against the Roman Catholic Church (Fea
2018, 88). In turn, the Know-Nothing movement in the 1840s and 1850s became a
secular version of the evangelical oppositions to Catholic immigrants and
propagated the notion of the United States being a Protestant nation (Fea 2018, 91-92).
In terms of race, Southern evangelicals found it easy to justify slavery and the
South’s social order based on the Bible (Stewart 2019. 105-11). Even Finney supported
segregation and race-based prejudice (Jones 2020, 81). Indeed, post-Civil War
evangelical culture was integral to the reestablishment of White supremacy across
the South – the so-called “lost cause.” A racist civil religion emerged. Statues rose
to confederate heroes such as Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Jefferson
Davis. Catechisms were distributed on slavery. The Confederate Battle Flag
became a symbol of a civil religion steeped in religious nationalism. The Ku Klux
Klan, both in its inception circa 1870 and its reconstitution in the 1920s has always
seen itself as a Christian organization. The Klan’s virulent opposition to Blacks,
Catholics, Jews, and non-Christian immigrants is grounded in the evangelical notion
of sustaining a Christian nation against the infidel (Fea 2018, 107-08).
In turn, the rise or fundamentalist preachers in 1920s, who railed against
modernist interpretation of scripture as propagating heresy and skepticism defended
the Klan’s campaign against “African Americans, Catholics, Jews, and immigrants”
(Fea 2018, 108). They also strongly opposed the presidential candidacy of the
Catholic Al Smith in the 1920s, reigniting the anti-Catholic sentiment of the Know
Nothing movement decades earlier. Fea points out the Texas fundamentalist, J.
Frank Norris, “connected Smith’s campaign to satanic forces” (Fea 2018, 107).
No doubt, the issues of doctrinal purity and piety in evangelical action led the
fundamentalists to be active in the Prohibition movement on basis of being opposed
to sinful activities. However, this moral zeal, on the intellectual level, let them to
create an alternative higher education system opposed to the lure of secularism,
especially found in modernist theological criticism and the teaching of evolution:
“Bible colleges and other fundamentalist education institutions shielded the faithful
from secular temptations that had the potential to undermine their faith” (Fea 2018,
110). Picking up on the religious nationalist stress apocalyptic struggle,
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fundamentalist preachers sought “to scare the hell out of their followers with
conspiracy theories about Catholics, communists, modernists, and … isms of all
kind” (Fea 2018, 111).
Finally, although perhaps not directly attributable to evangelicalism and
fundamentalism, there are other political acts in U.S. history that fit into the
narratives on pursuing the promised land and engaging in armed struggle against
those who are evil. Andrew Jackson removed the Cherokee in the southeastern
United States in the Veil of Tears march. The American First Committee in the
1940s, which came out of Yale University, manifested “racism and anti-Semitism”
(Fea 2018, 171). The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s conducted Operation
Wetback which deported countless Mexicans, who a decade earlier during World
War II, were given jobs in factories and fields to replace Americans serving in the
armed forces. In turn, Richard Nixon in 1968 picked up on George Wallace’s
segregationist rhetoric by pledging to institute law and order to quell urban riots
committed largely by African Americans. Finally, Ronald Reagan enticed white
working-class voters with his appeal to pursuing the Puritan’s “city on the hill” and
his resistance to the rising tide of identity politics movements. All of these examples
play into the fear conjured by the evangelical and fundamentalist triad of piety,
doctrinal purity, and crusading zeal. When Donald Trump vilified Latin American and
Muslim immigrants, he was tapping into a deep vein of fear and xenophobia in the
U.S. religious nationalist tradition.
As accented in the previous section, the Christian Right has suggested that
Donald Trump, despite his personal drawbacks, had been hailed by God to rebuild
the U.S. infrastructure and to protect the United States from its enemies in desperate
times. Indeed, much of President Trump’s rhetoric, both before and after his 2016
election, “trumpeted” an American national identity that was supposedly under threat
from leftist enemies within and immigrants and aliens without (Fea 2018, 40-41).
Ultimately, rendering the impact of the Christian Right on U.S. politics since
World War II as simply due to patriarchalism, reactions to progressive public polices,
political ideology, or as a form of cultural nationalism is incomplete. Without a
doubt, patriarchy, nativist sentiments, and reactions to progressive identity politics
are very much part of the support the Christian Right has given Donald Trump, his
questionable moral life notwithstanding. Still, beneath these explanations remains
the key religious nationalist narratives of the pursuit of the promised land through
conquest and the apocalyptic rendering of the bloody struggle between good and
evil that goes all the way back to the spiritual norms propagated by the Puritans and
in the evangelical Great Awakenings. Grasping this history provides normative
depth to the more contemporary studies by Du Mez, Posner, Stewart, and
Whitehead and Perry, among others and conversely, these more contemporary
studies reveal the challenges Christian nationalism, in its pursuit of power politics,
poses to U.S. democracy.
The Secularized Great Awakening
As much as theological narratives and historical precedents do inform the
Christian Right’s support for Donald Trump, there are at least two dimensions in
85

The 2021 Proceedings of the ASSR

which Trump has secularized this heritage. First, his “lost America” narrative, a
recasting of the Southern “lost cause,” has played very well among those people
who feel that the country has left them behind. In the 2016 Republican primaries, as
Timothy Carney points out, Trump did well in conservative counties where the local
economies and civil societies had collapsed. Beyond just people losing their
livelihoods, the intermediate associations that had given people in these regions a
sense of place and acceptance – what Robert Putnam terms the pursuit of social
capital - had consequently disappeared. Many of these people were no longer even
going to church. Instead, their political outlooks became shaped by conservative
talk radio, television outlets, and internet sites. By contrast, where local economies
and civil societies were thriving, such as Chevy Chase, Maryland, voters in the
Republican primaries opted for John Kasich or Marco Rubio, not Trump (Carney 2019,
1-14). Of course, even in these prosperous counties, come the 2016 general election,
many of these same voters shifted their support to Trump.
Whether justified or not, in places where the economic and civil society had
collapsed, people saw themselves as victims and were receptive to rhetoric about
the supposed internal and external “others” who were destructive of what they saw
as the American way of life – a mantra that I have shown goes back at least to the
First Great Awakening, if not the Puritans. Hence, these potential voters were drawn
to someone who claimed that they would make America great again. Trump quite
effectively has spun this contorted nostalgia to his advantage: “a masquerade of
history…that is concerned with the past, but in a self-absorbed way, free of any
concern with facts” (Snyder 2017, 121). He has been a master at manipulating people’s
fears, angers, and resentments (Du Mez 2020, 249; Escobar 2020, 106). Ironically, people
who had fallen way from church life due to the decline of local community institutions
have found religion again, but this time in a civil religion that is well steeped in
religious nationalism.
This twenty-first century articulation of “going to church” brings me to my
second point. Finney, in the Second Great Awakening, when he turned from being a
lawyer to being an evangelist, was moved by and learned from the organizing
techniques of politicians (Weaver 2009, 140). Trump, on the other hand, has reversed
the process. Instead of political techniques influencing religious evangelization,
Trump took the dynamics of televangelists, pioneered by Billy Graham and others in
the 20th century, and employed them effectively for political theatre: “his rallies were
more like tent revivals, his speeches like a televangelist’s promise of miraculous
success than considered policy prescription” (Posner 2020, 14). Moreover, the aura,
much manufactured, of Trump’s financial success – his private jet and his properties
such as Mar-a- Lago – resembles the lifestyle of those preachers pushing the
prosperity gospel. His connection with Paula White is not mere coincidence. The
personal reinforcement Trump has given to people at his rallies has a parallel to the
hope prosperity gospel preachers give to their following (Posner 2020,12-16).
Whether by design or not, a Trump rally is a secularized version of
evangelical camp meetings from the Great Awakening heritage both in style and
content. When disaffected people, as least in their own eyes, attend a Trump rally,
they are essentially going to a surrogate church. His evangelization is directed at
the common person, especially of white background, who has felt left behind and
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disparaged in the 21st century. The raucous and fervent character of many of his
rallies provide a highly-charged emotional experience for the participants. He
provides a congregational space where they feel they have a home and can
recommit themselves – a conversion of sorts – to an America in which white
dominance and social conservatism reemerge. The rallies provide a secularized
spirituality of the heart rather than a theological spirituality of the head.
In content, just as past great awakenings sought to galvanize spiritual
renewals by railing against church elites, Trump has used his “pulpit” to rail against
the liberal political socio-economic elites that comprise the mainstream media and
their identity politics agendas. These “sermons” resonate among those who either
alienated by or have been subjected to political correctness. As previously
illustrated, through U.S. history, those of the religious nationalist persuasion see
themselves fighting a holy war against infidels who supposedly threaten the moral
order – be it indigenous tribes, Catholics during the Know Nothing period, or AfricanAmericans during slavery, segregation, and post-segregation. When Trump has
vilified Mexican and Muslim immigrants or criticized Black Lives Matter protestors,
but not right-wing militias such as the Proud Boys, he has played very much into this
tradition that disparages the racial, ethnic, or religious others that supposedly
threaten the nation’s well-being. Seen against this backdrop, the insurrection at the
U.S. Capitol on 6 January 2021 immediately following a Trump rally was a secular
crusade animated by the symbols and themes of religious nationalism, including the
Confederate Battle Flag.
Unfortunately, Trump, enabled by Christian Right leaders, has promoted a
strident civil religion that plays upon the fears of his followers, rejects religious and
cultural diversity, and promotes a white nationalism, if not supremacy. Unabashedly,
he has mined the politics of fear that has always been in the history of the religious
nationalism so as to propagate an us v. them politics that is ultimately divisive and
certainly in tension with a Christian sense of charity.
Ultimately in this bargain, the Christian right has settled for “the things of this
world, rather than the things of Christ” (Howe 2019, 161). At least in rhetoric, Trump
promised a prosperous economy and a sense of security for believers (Howe 2019,
16). But he provided this sense of well-being to his “congregation members” through
vilifying other peoples, races, and faiths. Evangelicals who supported Trump have
essentially soiled their souls in this this partial gaining of worldly power: “Bitterness
over faith, Vengeance over justice. The world over the soul” (Howe 2019, 243).
The conventional fear regarding religious nationalism is that is that it will
transform a democracy into a rigid theocracy. Ironically, Trump has done the
opposite: he has taken the ambiance and content of the Great Awakenings and
secularized it. Not only have many evangelical leaders been lured by access to
political power, in the process, they have become enablers of a religious nationalism
that continues to find undesirable “others” to castigate in the name of spiritual
renewal. Trump’s civil religion is clearly antithetical to a genuinely pluralistic
democratic society in which an increasing number of religious and secular moral
heritages are able both to practice their beliefs and to contribute to charting a
common good for society.
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Conclusion
To summarize, whereas many have asked how could leaders of the Christian
Right get behind a leader of such moral ill-repute such as Donald Trump, I have
shown that Trump more so than his Republican predecessors delivered on many of
the issues on the Christian Right’s agenda in the contemporary culture wars. Other
studies have rendered the Christian Right support for Trump as primarily a projection
of male dominance, ethnocultural ideology, or simply an opposition to issues such as
affirmative action and gay marriages. I contend each of these arguments, although
valuable, too easily overlook that the Christian Right’s engagement in the
contemporary culture wars can be traced to a longstanding rejection of elites and
opposition to some racial/ethnic/religious demonic other in the Great Awakening
heritage. Trump’s genius has been to tap into this normative vein and give it a
secular rendering both in affect – his rallies – and in effect – his nativist policies and
practices.
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